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A quarter century after the decolonisation of Africa,
the dreams of those who struggled for national
independence lie shattered. Hunger stalks the land; the
factories stand idle; and the infrastructure, built at
such enormous cost, disintegrates. Inevitably, social
and political stability is undermined as past policy
approaches are discredited and the search for more
successful alternatives grows more urgent. Nowhere is
this need for new perspectives and new hope more
acute than in the area of industrialisation. The sector
that was once widely regarded as the key to
'development', is now even more widely presented as
the main villain of the piece; a bloated, overly
protected parasite devouring the surpluses eked out of
the soil by an oppressçd peasantry and thereby
actively destroying the very basis on which even its
own continued growth depends. Furthermore, it is
now widely held that the primary cause of this perverse
and generalised outcome has been the myopic, venal
and misguided behaviour of a self-seeking, urban
African elite that has pursued its own short-term
interests at the expense of both efficiency and welfare.
The present crisis is thus seen as the cumulative result
of countless industrial (and infrastructural) investment
decisions, made with 'inadequate regard for their
lively economic and financial rate of return' [World
Bank 1984a:24].
This assessment of Africa's post-independence failure
is rapidly assuming the status of 'received wisdom', if
only by virtue of the fact that it is militantly asserted by
those institutions that control the world's non-
commercial financial flows. Thus, in the latest of a
series of increasingly sophisticated reviews of Africa's
problems, the World Bank suggests that this debate
has reached the point where 'the emerging consensus
on policy issues dwarfs any remaining areas of dissent'
and that 'neither the essential objectives of Africa's
development nor the policy issues that must be
addressed to achieve them are in dispute, even though
views on timing and priorities may differ'. Moreover,
the conclusions thus reached are thought to be so clear
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and specific that 'action in the main areas of
agreement will be enough to ensure economic
progress' [World Bank 1984a:2-3]. Such optimism is
certainly welcome. However, to judge whether it is
also plausible requires an examination of the proposed
policy changes and of the analysis on which they are
based.
The issue is particularly important because access to
international finance is to be made strictly conditional
on acceptance of this 'consensus' and on the closely
supervised implementation of its policy prescriptions.
Reluctance to comply is to be overcome with a more
effective combination of sticks and carrots. Since
Africa's crushing debt burden is stick enough for the
moment, the present emphasis is on better rewards for
good behaviour, to encourage those who hesitate.
Hence, while
there are definite signs of greater willingness of
African governments to consider and undertake
policy reforms, only a few. . . are likely to be ready
immediately. Donors should (therefore) . . . assure
that adequate external support can be rapidly
mobilised for additional countries when they
embark on a major reform programme (and) a
special facility might be established to maintain a
reserve for this prupose [World Bank 1984b: 19]
Of course governments need not only recognise 'the
need for reforms' but must also see 'which direction to
take', if they are to participate in 'the development of
appropriate macroeconomic and sectoral policies'
[World Bank 1984b:17]. The implementation of such
'appropriate' policies is to be systematically supported
by a more coordinated aid effort, ensuring that all
donors accept the same definition of 'appropriate'
[World Bank 1984a:4 1ff]. For governments with the
requisite 'political will' the issue thus becomes a
largely technical one that can be substantially resolved
if donor agencies 'help design national action
programmes, and then, most importantly, provide
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their aid within this framework' [World Bank
1984b: 17].
The Substance of the 'New Consensus'
While it would certainly be encouraging and desirable
if the policies needed to rescue Africa from its present
plight were 'not in dispute', it would also be truly
remarkable at a time when the economics profession is
in disarray and disrepute and the global policy debate
has become a cacophony of discord. It is not,
therefore, surprising to find that the much vaunted
consensus is only skin deep and that, apart from
agreement on certain short term responses to the
current crisis, it does not extend far beyond the
platitude that Africa needs to achieve greater
efficiency in its use of resources.
This is not to deny the importance of the increased
consensus on short term measures, already discussed
in the editorial of this Bulletin. It is certainly significant
that the World Bank has now abandoned the extreme
position developed in its Accelerated Development
Report [World Bank 1982], which placed largely
unqualified faith in the market's ability to rectify the
problems of Africa. In its most recent review of this
subject [World Bank l984a] it has developed a more
subtle and serious argument which explicitly recognises
the importance of institutional and political factors
and clearly acknowledges the virtual impossibility of
significantly increasing African export earnings in the
short term (see Martin Godfrey's article). This allows
it to see clearly that any attempt to reverse Africa's
present downward spiral will necessarily require a
heavy injection of concessional, programme (non-
project) funding that will allow existing industrial and
infrastructural facilities to be rescued from their
current disastrous paralysis. At the same time,
however, there has been far less convergence regarding
the more general social and economic policy changes
revealed as necessary by the events of the last 25 years.
In effect, the urgent need for concessional funds is now
agreed; the nature of the conditions that should be
attached to these funds is not.
On th'e more general policy issues, the most recent
Bank review remains firmly committed to the view
that Africa should allow private enterprise and world
market prices to play a much greater role in
determining resource allocation. What has been
revised, somewhat, is its judgement of the feasible and
desirable speed of that adjustment and, rather less
clearly, its view of the nature of the optimal socially
and politically defined limits required to condition the
operation of the 'free market'.
In a certain general sense these conclusions are
virtually unassailable, especially so long as they
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remain as 'short on specifïcs' as they must inevitably
be in a discussion of so numerous and heterogeneous a
set of economies as those of sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA). Certainly in such a context it would be foolish
even to attempt to define a universally applicable
'optimal' balance between public and private sectors,
or between competition and protection. Nevertheless,
in spite of the great differences between SSA countries,
in terms of size, resources and politics, their present
position has some remarkably general features. Thus
it is possible to agree that in most of SSA today the
rationality of price signals has been substantially
undermined; foreign exchange earnings are insufficient
to meet debt repayments or to sustain economic
growth; and agricultural sectors have generally been
undermined by the needs of rapidly deteriorating non-
agricultural sectors. These, however, are the symptoms
and not the causes of Africa's malaise and there is little
consensus regarding the mechanisms that have led to
such a remarkably uniform outcome in such diverse
settings, or on the policy changes needed to reverse
past trends.
As regards these more general issues, the alleged new
consensus appears to contain little that is new and
nothing that could reasonably be regarded as a
safeguard against a repeat of past 'mistakes'. Indeed,
'the new approach' is largely 'the old approach'
dressed up in new rhetoric. It is not likely to exorcise
the evil spirits that have bedevilled the region's
development efforts for the simple reason that it has
learned the wrong lessons from its recent past.
It's not Always so Easy to be Wise After the
Fact?
The chief lesson that has apparently been learned by
the international agencies is that 'the heart of Africa's
economic crisis is the low rate of return on its capital
investment' [World Bank 1984:41]. That, in turn, is
largely said to be the result of 'inadequate discipline
over the use of investment resources' resulting from
the intrusion of domestic social and political pressures
that fail to appreciate that 'changing the structure of
an economy still requires strict adherence to criteria
for project selection and design in order to maximise
the return on investment' [World Bank 1984a:24].
Foreign donors (and investors?) are allocated a
modest share of the blame, because they have been too
lax and uncoordinated to ensure an 'adequate' regard
for this need 'to maximise the return on investment'.
This position is developed from a perspective in which
the market defines efficiency. Hence, its influence is
assumed, by definition, to induce efficiency except
where 'imperfections' require institutional inter-
vention. This, in turn, has to be primarily designed to
ensure that investment decisions are insulated from
'distortions' stemming from 'unwarranted' domestic
social or political pressures. The hope for the future
lies in the fact that the international financial
institutions are to coordinate and intensify their
monitoring of Africa's economies, in order to ensure
that efficiency, in this sense, is maximised.
The discussion of SSA's industrial experience clearly
reflects this orientation. Between 1970 and 1984 SSA
saw: an increase in its share of global manufacturing
value added; a substantial rise in the proportion of its
people employed in industry; and a decline in its share
of global manufactured exports, which fell from a tiny
share (0.47 per cent) to a negligible one (0.24 per cent).
The juxtaposition of these trends is said to illustrate
the growth of an inefficient, uncompetitive sector that
'becomes a burden on the more efficient and dynamic
parts of the economy' [World Bank 1984a:361
especially through its high net import costs that
contribute to the acute foreign exchange shortage that
now throttles growth and devastates productivity
levels. As a result one can agree that today a high
proportion of SSA's industry is: relatively uncom-
petitive and dependent on high protective barriers; too
net import intensive; and paying wages and salaries
not justified at present productivity levels (a corollary
of its relative inefficiency). However, agreement on the
reasons for this outcome is nothing like as widespread
as those emphasising the 'new consensus' appear to
think.
Even without a detailed discussion of Africa's
industrialisation, [World Bank 1984aJ Toward Sus-
tained Development concludes confidently that, in this
sphere too, the basic problem was a failure to allow
market forces to exert more influence over resource
allocation. Moreover, in spite to its frequent
references to various institutional issues, its discussion
remains firmly rooted in the imaginary, equilibrium
world of neoclassical economics, as indicated by its
frequent implicit use of concepts like 'equilibrium
exchange rates' and 'undistorted market prices'. Thus,
Africa's industrial problems are summarised in the
following terms:
Outside agriculture, price distortions have been
reduced in recent years . . . However, the
distortions resulting from price controls and
relatively high levels of industrial protection
remain severe in most of sub-Saharan Africa.
Many of the most wasteful investments have been
oriented toward sluggish (or declining) and heavily
protected internal markets. Those that have been
export oriented have often been made unsuccessful
by overvalued exchange rates. In a period of
structural adjustment, those that have no future,
even in an environment of improved foreign
exchange availability and other incentives, should
be the first togo.. . greater regional integration will
follow from more open trade and currency
arrangements . . . (while) flexible exchange rates
will frequently be necessary to stimulate more open
trade and currency arrangements
[World Bank 1984a:36-71
This conveys a clear message. Even in Africa today,
market forces operating through 'more open trade and
currency arrangements' and through 'flexible exchange
rates' will play a crucial role in rectifying the errors of
the past by eliminating 'lame ducks' and increasing
efficiency. Even the problem of regional integration
will become less intractable once market forces are
thus released. Evidently, the possibility that many of
the wasteful economic activities now in existence
might actually be primarily the result of market
pressures is simply ruled out by the assumption that
market pressures induce efficiency.
True as this may be under certain circumstances, it is
hardly the whole story. However, the Report barely
acknowledges that: competitive pressures can and do
destroy businesses and people; the 'equilibrium
exchange rate' may involve wage rates and income
levels below subsistence; the 'real' international
market may saddle weaker protagonists with more
than their share of unemployment, destitution or
starvation; more open markets can increase uncertainty
and transmit costly, economically unjustifiable and
politically manipulated 'market signals' (such as
today's extortionate international interest rates) or
drive hard pressed economies into disastrous
competition, 'over-producing' a restricted range of
commodities. While these problems are not inevitable,
they surely deserve to be taken seriously in Africa
today.
Equally problematic is the Report's failure to examine
the possible link between 'more open markets' and the
politics of industrial (and general economic) policy,
apart from the passing remark that 'in countries that
encouraged private enterprise, governments gave
businesses too much protection' [World Bank
l984a:25]. Apparently the authors are not disposed to
enquire why this should have been such a common
experience. Similarly, the Report repeatedly recognises
the crucial need for clear strategic choices made from a
national perspective if one is ever to overcome the
problem that 'projects have not always been consistent
with the priorities necessary for achieving national
development objectives' [World Bank l984a:41] or if
one is to reconcile the 'static efficiency' of the short
and medium term with the rationality defined by
society's long term objectives [World Bank 1984a:4,
24, 37, 41, 42, 45, 47]. Unfortunately, apart from
deploring SSA's 'lack of a tradition of national
political organisation' [World Bank l984a:25] this too
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is treated as an 'exogenous' problem, unrelated to the
economic policy issues at the centre of the discussion.
Drawing General Lessons from a General
Experience
It is more than a little ironic that in the 1980s the
discussion of SSA's experience should witness this
reassertation of the belief in a benign and manageable
market. It is even more ironic that this region's
experience is apparently held to undermine the
arguments of those liberals and radicals loosely
grouped under the dependency label, since from the
outset their central concern was the danger that
market induced, 'neo-colonial' patterns of develop-
ment would often prove disastrous in the weaker
developing countries. In fact, Africa's present crisis
powerfully illustrates the legitimacy of their fears. As
is well known this school feared that the 'neocolonial'
patterns of development would lead to: excessive
import dependence; an anti-peasant and anti-food
bias; an unmanageable debt burden; deteriorating
terms of trade; divisive and ultimately unsustainable
consumption patterns; an erosion of the ability to
formulate or implement nationally defined strategies;
and a degree of political polarisation and militarisation
that would allow the eventual crises to be met by
virtually unlimited repression, supported by inter-
national capital, anxious to ensure that, whatever the
domestic circumstances, priority should be given to
debt repayment. In this view, domestic circumstances
simply have to adjust to 'the facts of economic life'
created in the meantime by these development
patterns. From this perspective the 'new orthodoxy'
simply appears as the rationalisation of the last
desperate stage in that process.
This does not imply that those who feared and
anticipated the present outcome were able to propose
(or implement) effective alternative policies, since
clearly they were not. It does mean, however, that
Africa's recent experience should increase our interest
in those analytic perspectives, especially since many of
those now espousing the 'new orthodoxy' had long
denigrated such fears, arguing that: concerns about
consumption patterns represented a misplaced
egalitarianism, as Africa's 'modernising elites' were
the only conceivable source of the expertise and
savings required for 'development'; that there was
little danger in a heavy reliance on primary exports,
whose terms of trade were not likely to fall; and that
this base could safely be supplemented by as much
capital as one could attract to expand industry and
services for 'job creation'. Concerns about debt
burdens were generally met by reminders that in a
growing world, growing debts were only natural.
72
Given the fact that SSA's current problems stretch
across the ideological spectrum one suspects that the
present consensus should be to acknowledge that
history has clearly borne out the fears of the
dependency school in the case of the world's weakest
economies. But that it has also shown the problem of
averting those outcomes to be more intractable than
had been imagined, This consensus could also include
agreement on a series of important priorities, as is
strikingly illustrated by the fact that most of the
essential priorities identified by Toward Sustained
Development could be found more eloquently stated in
Nyerere's central policy documents arguing the case
for Tanzania's 'alternative' policy in 1967 [Nyerere
1968]. These also called for a heavy emphasis on
agriculture; emphasised the importance of food
security; deplored inappropriate consumption patterns
and excessive urban incomes; called for greater
concern with small-scale production and more
indigenous, less import intensive technologies; sought
foreign capital inflows, compatible with 'national
development objectives'; and urged a shift to more
appropriate education.
Here the scope for consensus ends, however. The 'new
orthodoxy', having belatedly come to espouse this
position, dismisses the idea that present problems may
be largely a result of the pressures exerted on SSA's
relatively weak economies by the 'imperfect markets'
of the neocolonial world. Instead it asserts that they
are the result of excessive intervention in the market by
exonegously determined 'political' forces that primarily
reflect the short-sighted greed of a self-serving,
bureaucratic, urban elite, which is presumably the
former 'modernising elite', unaccountably 'gone bad'.
The international agencies are bravely asked to
shoulder a small part of the blame, but only for not
being firm enough with their unruly wards. By this
means, Africa's crisis is presented as just as much
proof of the beneficent efficiency of the market, as the
success of the mythical 'laissez-faire South Korea' and
now, in Toward Sustained Development, also the
experience of the equally mythical 'open economy of
India'.t One can admire the flexibility of the paradigm
and the perseverance of the protagonists, but one
cannot defend the argument or its conclusions; nor
The use of India in Toiiatd Sustained Development to illustrate the
benefits ofa 'market oriented' policy is quite remarkable. Until late
into the l970s India was considered a major problem because of its
excessively nationalist policy. especiafly as regards food and
industry. Indeed I recall arguing at a conference in 1977 that, if the
more pessimistic prognoses of the world economy were accurate,
then the longer term strength of the Indian pattern might well make
it into the 'success story' of the l980s. displacing Brazil's more
ephemeral and riskier gains. Of course, as a more 'nationalist'
approach gains in relative strength il can afford to become more
open and will also attract more capital. though on its own terms. At
this point the symptoms can he presented as causes in order for yet
another miracle' lobe revealed, confirming the faith in economic
liberalisation.
can one realistically hope that the policy perspectives
thus derived will bring much relief to the people of
Africa.
Having thus reaffirmed the market's virtues, it is not
surprising to find the 'new consensus' proposing a
largely unchanged policy perspective, dressed up in a
new rhetoric and ostensibly differentiated from its
earlier version by certain changes in emphasis. What
remains unchanged is the message that the African
countries should: encourage the international market
to determine patterns of resource allocation; emphasise
strongly the provision of incentives to foreign capital
to create jobs; rely heavily on external experts to
ensure 'efficient' project selection; and accept
agricultural exports as the basic engine of growth,
while relying both on rapid increases in total
agricultural output and on food imports to meet food
requirements. These are surely the very same
principles that have guided most of SSA's post-
colonial governments and the public and private
agencies providing their foreign finance. Why then
should one expect different results in future?
The authors of Toward Sustained Development would
presumably disagree with this formulation, arguing
that, although lip-service may have been paid to these
principles, they were largely ignored in practice. This,
in spite of the fact that they would accept that in SSA
virtually every project of any size has been vetted by
external 'experts' applying general commercial
principles, so much so that the Report itself concludes
that 'in many African countries, the pattern of
development spending has become increasingly
determined by the aggregation of aid programmes'
[World Bank 1984a:4J. Even so, they would argue that
in future things would be different if their Report were
accepted and implemented, because then these same
principles would actually be applied more rigorously,
under the watchful eye of the better coordinated and
more activist financial agencies that are proposed.
Unfortunately, however, these conclusions are uncon-
vincing, because they misrepresent both the technical
and the political causes of the presently observed
'excessive divergence' from 'undistorted market
prices'.
In practice, as Toward Sustained Development
acknowledges, adherence to commercial principles
can never actually determine policy since it always
leaves large areas of uncertainty, including: the need to
judge the present and future strengths and weaknesses
of markets and.institutions; the need to define 'social
time preference' and national development objectives;
and the need to choose between the relative risks of
alternative strategies. These factors define legitimate
and important areas of uncertainty in which the
application of static efficiency criteria is quite
inapproriate and this will be as true in future as it has
been in the past. Hence, a substantial divergence from
'undistorted' market prices will continue to be
'justified' even on narrow economic grounds, and the
optimal degree of that divergence will continue to be
unknown. Toward Sustained Development acknow-
ledges this scope for 'genuine mistakes and mis-
fortunes' but asserts that these 'cannot explain the
excessive number of 'white elephants' in SSA [World
Bank 1984a:24]. This may be so, but one suspects that,
at a time when bankruptcies in much stronger
economies are at record levels due to the radical
changes that have occurred in international prices,
markets and interest rates, a rather large proportion of
these 'white elephants' would qualify as genuine
'mistakes and misfortunes'. For some reason the
Report hardly addresses the question of how exposure
to this risk might be reduced in future, especially in the
case of those economies that are so weak that they
could not respond dynamically to an increase in
international competitive pressures.
Three factors determine this risk: the degree of
instability and uncertainty in the international
economy; the directness of an economy's exposure to
such external fluctuations; and the degree of optimism
embodied in the critical judgements that always have
to be made in defining strategies or selecting projects.
The first two of these clearly suggest the need for
particular care in 'opening up' relatively weak
economies, especially when international economic
instability is likely to be a major problem; the third
raises further important issues that have also been
largely ignored in Toward Sustained Development.
These will be considered in the context of a discussion
of that other type of 'market distortion': that is not
economically justifiable; that is usually deemed to be
politically induced; and that is accorded such great
significance by the Report.
It has been shown that this Report holds the African
elites primarily responsible for Africa's present plight
because they are deemed to have put their short-term,
sectional self-interest before their own and the
nation's longer term interests, partly out of ignorance
and partly out of weakness. This problem is now to be
rectified because their ignorance is to be cured by the
'realisation' that it was their failure to heed
commercial principles more directly that lies at the
heart of the current crisis. At the same time, their
weakness in the face of internal political pressures,
generally portrayed as illegitimate sectional demands,
is to be cured by adding a bigger carrot (the highly
conditional 'special facility') to existing sticks (the
debt itself, aid to enforce 'law and order', exclusion
from normal IMF facilities, toleration or support of
violent subversion). Their backbones thus strengthened
and their thinking clarified by a larger, more
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coordinated input of external expertise, Africa's elites
are once again to become the spearheads of
development. No mention is made of the possibility
that harrassed officials desperately trying to attract
foreign capital to ailing and weak economies beset by
urgent social and political problems, will once again
find themselves with little bargaining power vis-à-vis
those providing the capital. The existence of this
pressure is, after all, the reason why the Report
repeatedly acknowledges that 'donors must take some
responsibility (for the current difficulties): the
pressures they put on governments, the inappropriate
design and selection of their products, and the lack of
coordination among themselves - have all contributed
to the low rates of return on investment', though one
wonders what benefit would have been derived if
agencies, selecting and designing projects 'inapprop-
riately', had coordinated their efforts better. Surely,
the fact that levels of protection are generally so high
in SSA has a lot to do with the great influence exerted
under such conditions by the foreign investor, and
here the private investor is at least as 'guilty' as the
much pilloried aid agency.
The most extraordinary aspect of the discussion in
Toward Sustained Development is that, in spite of its
clear interest in the problems created by conflicting
sectional interests, it fails even to consider the
possibility that 'external financial agencies' might
represent interests that could conflict with those
'national development objectives' that it rightly
identifies as vitally important. Indeed, this presumed
neutrality of international agency 'expertise', or of
foreign investment, is a vital feature of its discussion
and one that effectively obscures yet another critically
important issue from view.
In fact it is surely obvious that aid donors and foreign
investors do have interests that systematically guide
their behaviour; and that chief among these is the
desire to sell goods or services (machinery, projects) or
extend loans and then to ensure that payment for such
transactions will be effected promptly and in hard
currency. Furthermore, since investors have managed
to spread the responsibility for honouring the
consequent commitments across society as a whole
through government loan guarantees, they now have
every inducement to push projects and loans
systematically beyond commercially, economically or
socially prudent limits, since the cost of project failure
will not be borne by them, but by the recipient national
economies. This surely was an important reason why
donors and contractors continued to push new
projects even when the economic prospects of most
African countries were clearly, decidedly bleak.2
Governments, always under pressure to achieve
higher growth and operating under a severe foreign
exchange constraint, naturally find it almost impossible
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to refuse such funds, especially since they always come
along with commercial feasibility studies showing
them to be viable and desirable.
This effectively represents a powerful and systematic
source of pressure inducing excessively optimistic
assumptions tobe made in the process of project and
programme selection, and the Bank's latest proposals
would possibly even strengthen the mechanisms that
produce this result. So long as these pressures remain
undiminished, investment will continue to be pushed
to high risk levels, with the result that Africa will
continue to teeter on the edge of economic disaster,
heavily exposed to unforseen reverses such as those it
has recently suffered; always being pushed beyond its
borrowing capacity and hence, continually forced to
demand greater efficiency and more sacrifice of its
people in order to meet the obligations thus assumed.
Under these circumstances, some modest increase in
the efficiency of resource use would do little to alter
SSA's basic position. Indeed, at present, any such
'success' would largely serve to further depress many
of its export prices and reduce the already limited
willingness of creditors to ease its accumulated debt
burden. In this context it may be noteworthy that, in
spite of its candour in acknowledging the role played
by 'exernal agencies' in pushing unwise and unjustified
projects into SSA, Toward Sustained Development
never draws the logical conclusion that a belief in
market principles might suggest, namely that the debts
thus incurred should be written off, as unwise
investors paid the price of their folly.
In industrial policy terms this means that there will
continue to be powerful pressures inducing projects to
be technically justified by 'optimistic' judgements
concerning the crucial imponderables on which every
project evaluation hinges. It is likely that this was the
main reason for the so-called 'inadequate regard for'
the rate of return on projects, shown by foreign
investors and donors and deplored by the Report.
2 Those who have been involved in the process of project and
programme selection in countries like Tanzania will know only too
well the constant frustration of 'winning the argument for some
programme that has low import intensity, high participation, low
capital intensity and strong multipliers, because it diffuses income
widely, only to find that the 'decision' goes a different way because
some immediately more attractive, more capital intensive
alternative has emerged. The latter will be hacked by finance from
abroad; shown to be 'feasible' by some technocratic document
prepared by 'esperts' and comprehensible to very few; and will
undoubtedly help to achieve more growth n the short term. These
are not isolated cases. They are endemic, and they arise because the
external pressures that sell or lend by 'fomenting optimism' readily
find local partners hoping to share in the consequent benefits. The
present attempt to blame these factors on the aid agencies alone is
completely wrong. Commercial donors and the more commercially
oriented agencies are systematically the worst offenders. Indeed, the
only donors who sometimes take a longer view and support lower
risk options are the agencies that are not dominated by these
principles.
However, the Report's new proposals change nothing
in this regard, except for a few marginal adjustments
related to the current crisis. It is these adjustments that
are used to suggest that this Report contains
something that is substantially different from the
practices of the now discredited 'development
economists', who had, after all, been in the business of
applying commercial criteria to the real world. Thus, it
is suggested that the future application of commercial
principles will reduce protection, encourage the
expansion of efficient export production and support
programme, as against project, lending. However,
these differences amount to very little in fact. The first
two simply amount to making extremely optimistic
assumptions as to what is possible in SSA in the short
or medium term and as to what scope there is for
resisting the demands of investors demanding
continued protection. The new willingness to support
programme aid is significant, but is clearly a specific
response to the immediate fear that the ability to repay
past debt obligations may now be in jeopardy. Indeed,
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this is the
main reason for the urgent tone of the present
discussion; after all, possibly the biggest change
implied by the new proposals is the further insulation
of the decision making process from those domestic
social and political pressures that might otherwise
divert attention from the primary need to 'maximise
economic and financial returns'.
When all is said and done, if the Bank's proposals are
accepted, the same suppliers and donors, using the
same techniques and principles and under the same (or
greater) pressures to sell (or 'recycle') will continue to
dominate the process of project selection, and in the
process effectively preempt choices about development
priorities. To be sure, projections will be a little more
cautious for a brief period, until repayment of existing
obligations has been assured, but they clearly stand
poised to take up any slack that may appear. For the
African masses there will be little respite. They will
continue to be bombarded with endless appeals for
that little additional increase in efficiency or reduction
in costs, that will allow yesterday's obligations to be
met.
The cruel fact is that when things get difficult
economically, as they did after the early 1970s, the
weak do most of the suffering as the strong use their
strength to secure their position. It seems slightly
obscene to tell Africa to 'pull itself together and
become more efficient' when it has had the rug pulled
out from under its feet by the harsh and unjustified
policies of the main industrial nations, which have
added a crushing interest rate subsidy to the richest
people in the richest nations, to the heavy burdens
already imposed on Africa by changes in commodity
prices, markets and climatic patterns. Under these
circumstances it is far from clear on what basis it is
asserted that internal policy failures are the root cause
of Africa's current problems and even less clear why
policies that largely confirm and strengthen past
patterns of investment and of project selection could
be expected to reverse past trends.
Politics: the Neglected Dimension
What then are the implications for Africa and
especially for its long term aim to industrialise? The
central point is simple enough. If Africa is to develop
its productive forces to benefit its people then it must
develop the capacity to manage its integration with the
international economy in a manner that allows
benefits to be weighed against the attendant risks.
Furthermore, in assessing these risks it should be
recognised that the international market is an arena of
struggle in which political and economic dimensions
are inextricably intertwined, and in which the more
powerful are able to turn many things to their
advantage. Certainly it would be wrong to assume that
the international financial institutions represent no
particular interests or that their 'neutral' expertise
could play a central role in building up a nation's
capacity to define its 'national development objectives'
within that context. The task is precisely for each
nation (or group of nations) to define its (their)
interests in relation to those of other national and
international interests. In this regard, it is one of the
most difficult tasks to develop an ability to say 'No!'
to someone offering finance for a project that he
claims to have shown to be viable.
The latest Bank Report recognises the central
importance of this point, when it repeatedly states that
the expertise of the agencies must be applied within a
clearly defined framework that reflects 'national
development objectives'. The question is: 'how does
one achieve the capacity to accomplish that prior
task?' More to the point, is there not a real danger that
the 'premature' liberalisation of an economy could
undermine or destroy all hope of developing those
critical capacities? Certainly, without the ability to
define and to manage their 'constructive isolation'
from the external world, the African economies will
continue to be cast in the role of the remote periphery
that carries more than its fair share of global
unemployment and of the costs of global disequi-
librium. For many African countries today, an
'equilibrium exchange rate' would be one at which
many people' incomes would lie well below the level
needed even for survival.
For Africa, the lesson of the past 25 years is not that it
has not integrated itself sufficiently into the
international market. It is rather the opposite: that it
has integrated to a degree, and in a manner, that has
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simply proven unmanageable. It is now easy for any
old bank to see that a more cautious approach to
investment is needed, one that maintains a closer link
between agricultural and industrial incomes and that
contrains the growth of import intensive consumption
and production patterns. The difficult question is:
how does one create the degree of unity and of
cohesion that allows such a 'slow but steady' approach
to be applied, when powerful external pressures
reinforce domestic pressures from elites demanding
modern life-styles today; a general impatience for
material improvement; and a natural tendency to
make optimistic assumptions in a world where these
yield loans that purchase real goods? The most
difficult task is to build and maintain a domestic
coalition that would accept and support a policy that
settled for slower but steadier growth at lower risk, but
that could also ensure that the implied reduction of
external competitive pressures did not lead to
stagnation? That is the objective, and the task is to find
measures that will make its realisation easier in more
countries.
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The policies now being forced upon Africa will not
contribute to that objective, any more than they have
contributed to it in Jamaica, Guatemala or Chile.
They will rather polarise and destabilise an already
difficult situation and they will lead to efficiency only
in the narrowest and least socially defensible sense.
The challenge is to offer assistance in a form and 'on
conditions' that will help the African states to define
and to implement such 'low risk strategies', more
directly concerned with domestic welfare and security
and proceeding in a context where 'success' is defined
on the basis of a steady improvement in efficiency over
time, irrespective of whether this matches the cost
reductions achieved in South Africa's labour camps.
Suggestions that if the Africans just tried a little
harder, with help from the agencies, they could meet
present external challenges head on, are merely recipes
for the disasters of the future.
Unfortunately the experience of countries like
Tanzania and Guinea reminds us that this objective is
not attainable merely, because the need for an
alternative is recognised by those in power. However,
neither is it attainable through the international
agencies, even if they are temporarily converted to a
more cautious and more helpful view, a conversion
likely to last roughly as long as the possibility of debt
repayment is under threat. Nor, finally, is it attainable
merely as the automatic outcome of neocolonial
development patterns, as is apparently believed by
some theorists following in Bill Warren's footsteps,
who simply assume this transition, at the same time as
castigating various straw men who allegedly do not
take the political dimension of this problem seriously
and who are said to believe that closing an economy
will necessarily lead to socialism [Sender and Smith
1984]. Maybe this group's total rejection of all aspects
of the dependency debate would be modified if they
realised that that debate had actually addressed that
very question, namely: how does an economy achieve
the capacity to impose its own social and political
constraints on the operation of the market.
There is surely no formula that will solve SSA's
problem 'in general', but at least four things are
undoubtedly required if success is to become a
possibility. First, there has to be an economic
structure that gives significant power to the mass of a
nation's population and their representatives. Second,
the longer term risks associated with an economy's
external links have to be clearly recognised and
managed in the light of the knowledge that if these
move out of balance they can and will present any
society with totally unmanageable problems. Third,
the developed nations have to be induced, at least to
tolerate the adoption of such low risk domestic
policies, even when these do not coincide with the
interests of international capital. Fourth, there must
be a major remission of SSA's current debts since,
otherwise, any improvement that is achieved in a
desperately difficult situation will simply accrue to
Africa's vigilant and insatible creditors. In relation to
these tasks it has to be said that in spite of its advance
over previous Bank reviews of Africa's problems, the
proposals contained in Toward SustainedDevelopment
are wholly inadequate and still divert attention to
issues that, by themselves, cannot begin to solve the
problem. Indeed, seen from this perspective, the main
effect of those proposals would merely be the
perpetuation of old patterns. In that context, the main
thrust of the argument appears to be mainly to explain
why the destitute and starving people of Africa should
accept the payment of extortionate interest rates to
overfed and wealthy people, as an overriding
economic priority. It would be sad indeed if this view
commanded a consensus. Fortunately it does not.
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